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Abstract
Predator control cost-share contracts among livestock producers in North America
date back to 1630. A model is developed which provides refutable implications for
the structure and distribution of these contracts over time and space. Historical and
contemporary state and county level data on sheep producer coyote control generally
support the model.
Subject Code: 14
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ment of this document for non-commercial purposes by any means, provided that this
copyright notice appears on all such copies.When this ranch was opened, I poisoned and trapped the coyotes all out
but it was like trying to dig a hole in the sea; they came right back again.
E.P. Hilton, Southeast of Tucson, AZ (Young 1978).
Introduction
Livestock owners of the Massachusetts Bay Colony began jointly funding wolf bounties in
1630. Organized predator control funded by livestock owners existed in virtually every
colonial settlement by the end of the 1700s, and moved westward with the cattle industry
expansion of late 1800s. Many private livestock associations assessed dues to fund predator
control, and public livestock assessments were also common. Assessment programs continue
to be maintained through both private livestock groups and state and county government
in the form of a per-unit tax on an easily monitorable input such as livestock inventories or
land acreage.
This paper develops a model of an assessment contract that shows an inherent tradeoﬀ
between eﬃciency gains from internalizing abatement externalities and eﬃciency losses from
misallocation of the assessed input. The model is then extended to examine the determi-
nants of contract value and likelihood of contract formation. These contracts are examined
empirically in various contexts. An analysis of contract structure shows how institutions are
used to minimize contracting costs and how participation problems are addressed. A cross-
county probit analysis is used to explain contract distribution, and the eﬀects of producer
heterogeneity on contract formation. These empirical applications provide broad support for
the main predictions of the model.
Theory
Consider a set of landowners whose land lies within a predator population’s range, and who
reduce livestock depredation by lethal predator control. A number of widely cited popula-
tion biology models hypothesize that wildlife distributes itself to make best use of available
resources within its territory (Pulliam and Danielson 1991, Hestbeck 1988, Stenseth 1988),
1so lethal predator control on one landholding may reduce the predator density on neighbor-
ing landholdings as predators move to make use of the newly available food sources. When
acting independently, producers do not account for the predator control beneﬁts accrued by
neighboring producers, and suboptimal abatement levels result. This problem is analogous
to a wide range of common pool resource problems such as surface and ground water use,
oil production, and insect pest control.
Sharing abatement costs. Incentives leading to suboptimal abatement may be ad-
dressed by implementing an assessment contract. A fee, τ, is collected from each producer
per unit of a monitorable productive input such as livestock inventory or acreage. Producers
do not pursue abatement directly, but instead each pays τxi, which then is redistributed to
the group in the form of abatement. Contracting costs will initially be ignored. The ﬁrst-
best case in which abatement levels, assessed-input levels, and the assessment τ are jointly
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Implicit in this result is that τ is set to satisfy (2). Equation 2a implies that abatement will
be distributed such that its marginal value is equal across landholdings.
2In reality, producers are free to choose levels of x independently.1 In order to maxi-
mize their individual proﬁts subject to the assessment, producers will set xi such that their
marginal gains from x equal their own marginal costs (including τ): Ri
xi − (r + τ) = 0.
Compare this ﬁrst-order condition (which would enter as a constraint in problem (2)) to
the ﬁrst-best condition (2b). Given diminishing marginal productivity of x, less x will be
used relative to ﬁrst-best. It can be shown that eﬃciency gains are larger when Rxi (value




ai (total value marginal product of ai) is elastic.
Contract value and implementation. A contract value function is developed below
which provides refutable implications regarding the determinants of contract structure, value,
and formation. To simplify matters, additional structure is imposed on the group’s aggregate




be the after-damage revenues aggregated over all n
participants, where n ¯ R =
P
j Rj are total potential revenues, δ(·) ∈ [0,1] is the damage
function, A is abatement expenditures summed over all participants, and z is a vector of
factors aﬀecting the marginal product of abatement.
The following assumptions are implicit in this structure. Assessed-input inventories are
exogenous for each participant, so that producers do not respond to damage or assessments
by changing assessed-input inventories.2 It follows that for a given producer group, the
eﬃcient level of abatement can be attained by choosing the optimal assessment level τ.
Abatement is assumed lethal to the predator, and reduces the average or expected predator
stock on all landholdings. The damage rate δ is identical across all producers, and the
marginal product of abatement for a given abatement level is equal across producers, with
δi
aj < 0 and δi
aiaj > 0, for all i and j. Although δ is assumed identical across producers,
inventories of productive inputs need not be identical, so total damage may diﬀer across
producers. The marginal product of abatement is hypothesized to increase with increases in
1I know of no case in which assessed inputs are limited by a contract.
2Assessments (τ) are small compared to the value of the assessed input r, so distortionary eﬀects will be
small in this case. All assessments are less than a dollar/head/year for sheep, whereas the market value of
sheep in 1997 was $40 to $50 per hundredweight for sheep and $100 per hundredweight for lambs.
3four elements of z: the initial (before abatement) predator stock, ¯ w; the proportion of the
predator population’s territory owned by participants, l; the concentration of participants’
land within the predator’s territory, z; and the marginal propensity for the predator to
impose damage to livestock, δw.
Contracting is costly. Three sources of contracting costs and diﬃculties are considered.
First, the costs of assessment collection and abatement distribution increase with group
size (Lueck and Yoder 1997, Lueck 1994, Libecap 1989). Second, the likelihood of contract
formation depends in part on the skewness across producers of the net gains from a contract.
When net beneﬁts of a proposed assessment are highly skewed, more potential participants
may opt out, and costly bargaining to redistribute group abatement costs may be exacerbated
(Libecap 1989, p. 24). Third, the existing institutional structure within which a contract is
developed aﬀects contract costs and structure.
A group chooses abatement levels and a cost-sharing rule to maximize group proﬁts
subject to participation constraints and contracting costs. This can be viewed as a two-part
problem. First, abatement levels are set (implicitly by setting τ) to satisfy (2a) for every
feasible cost-sharing rule s ∈ s. Associated with each cost-sharing rule is ρ, the correlation
between the costs and beneﬁts of a contract among producers.3 Second, the cost-sharing
rule s that provides the highest group proﬁts (through its eﬀect on participation) is chosen.
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i ≥ 0 ∀ i,
where Ω describes characteristics of existing institutions that aﬀect contracting costs. Group
abatement techniques may diﬀer from those used by independent producers, and economies
of scale may aﬀect the marginal cost of abatement. Therefore, group marginal abatement
3Although ρ is chosen via the cost sharing rule, ρ is parametric for any given cost-sharing rule.
4costs, cc, may be diﬀerent from individual marginal abatement costs, cp.
Predator control provides positive production externalities. Therefore, group abatement
demand is larger than the sum of independent abatement demand.4 Maximization of (3)
leads to aggregate abatement levels of Ac, with Ap < Ac, where Ap is the sum across
producers of expenditures in absence of a contract and Ac are group abatement expenditures.5
The value of a contract can now be shown as the diﬀerence between the total value of
production under the optimal contract (subject to participation constraints and contracting
























i is the sum of proﬁts in the absence of a contract. Exogenous variables
are ¯ R, z, l, δw, ¯ w, cc, cp, ρ, and Ω. The comparative statics (omitted) follow from the
Envelope Theorem and are the basis the hypotheses listed below.
Voluntary versus mandatory participation. Predator control is a non-excludable
good, and a producer may gain from a contract without bearing any costs if the contract is
maintained without that producer’s participation. If non-participation is highly detrimental
to potential contract value, a contract may stipulate mandatory participation and include
punishment provisions for nonparticipation.6 Two forms of mandatory assessments exist:
predator control dues required by private producer associations, and public assessments
enforced by law.
4This assumes that if there are diseconomies of scale in abatement, they are not too large.
5If the contract incorporates all producers in the region (n = N), then Ac is at ﬁrst-best levels assuming
contracting costs are uncorrelated to abatement expenditures.
6Carlson and Wetzstein (1993) and Carlson, Sappie and Hammig (1989) discuss mandatory participation
in the context of insect pest control.
5Empirical evidence
In summary, The model predicts that the value and likelihood of a predator control contract
among livestock producers will increase in response to a(n):
1. increase in the output price or inventories of the damaged inputs.
2. increase in the predator density.
3. increase in the marginal propensity of the predator to impose damage.
4. decrease in the marginal cost of group abatement techniques.
5. increase in aggregate producer landholdings as a proportion of the wildlife territory.
6. increase in the spatial concentration of producers within the wildlife’s territory
7. increase in the correlation between cost shares and contract beneﬁt shares.
8. decrease in measurement, collection, and abatement redistribution costs.
9. decrease in the cost of enforcing participation.
10. Finally, existing institutions will be used in ways to reduce contracting costs.
These hypotheses will be examined in a number of settings. A discussion of contract structure
will be discussed ﬁrst, because it provides useful background for subsequent sections.
Monitoring costs and the choice of assessed input. The model implies that
ceteris paribus, the best input on which to base assessments is that which is most closely
correlated with the value of damage abatement (hypothesis 7). Public assessments tend
to be based on livestock inventories or associated quantities such as wool weight (table 2,
page 10). In contrast, private groups such as trapping clubs in Texas and the Cherry County
Association of Nebraska virtually always base their assessments on land acreage rather than
livestock inventories (McGinley 1997, Savage 1998).
Because both acreage and livestock inventories routinely are collected by tax assessors,
that public assessments tend to be based on livestock inventories suggests that livestock
inventories are more closely related to contract beneﬁt shares than other monitorable pro-
duction capital. Private groups do not have access to the private tax information, and
producers may be hesitant to share such information. Livestock must be counted by a group
representative or employee, both of which are costly options.
6Two characteristics of land reduce counting and monitoring costs for private groups:
acreage holdings do not change as often as livestock inventories for any given producer, and
landholding size is likely to be more diﬃcult to misrepresent to the group than the size
of a herd. Assessing acreage reduces contracting costs for private groups without cheap
information about participants’ livestock inventories. Thus, using land acreage rather than
livestock as the basis for an assessment is consistent with hypothesis 8.
The participation problem. Many historical and contemporary examples of both
voluntary and mandatory predator control assessments exist. The model provides insight
regarding the likelihood of voluntary versus mandatory assessments.
The Texas Wildlife Damage Management Service (TWDMS) subsidizes predator control
on private land. The TWDMS sets a subsidized trapper fee, and landowners form “trapping
clubs”. These clubs range in size, with an approximate average of about 10 landowners
per club (Nunley 1998, Savage 1998). Participants beneﬁt from economies of scale, because
increasing group size reduces each participants cost of employing the services of the TWDMS;
cc decreases and the value of a contract increases (hypothesis 4).
Aerial hunting has become a common method of predator control in the West (Phillips
and Nunley 1995). Using helicopters or airplanes requires large land areas for it to be a low-
cost abatement alternative. Except for owners of exceptionally large landholdings, producers
must share in the cost of renting aircraft with nearby neighbors. Despite the incentive to
underinvest in predator control, groups form in order to take advantage of economies of scale.
Thus, voluntary assessments appear often to be driven by reduced group abatement costs
relative to independent abatement costs (hypothesis 4).
When economies of scale in abatement are weak, the eﬀects of shirking and non-participa-
tion may be signiﬁcant enough for a group to induce participation by other means. After
funding its local wolf bounty program through voluntary contributions from its members for
8 years (from 1904 to 1912), the Piceance Creek Stock Growers Association of Rio Blanco
County, Colorado developed by-laws stipulating that cattlemen who did not pay their wolf
7dues could not participate in spring and fall roundups:
Members of this association refused to aid those cattlemen in arrears with wolf
assessments in any cooperative help with their roundups, whereby aid from the
whole cattlemen’s group was of great import in such stock gathering. This meant,
therefore, that whosoever reneged on the payment of his wolf bounty fee must
singly round up his own cattle, do his own branding, and run his own chuck wagon
— work of no small magnitude for a single individual where many square miles of
cattle range riding was involved (Young 1944, p. 364).
Excludable membership beneﬁts — economies of scale in roundups — are made contingent
on contributions to group predator control, thus providing a means of reducing the costs
of promoting participation by using existing cooperative institutions (hypothesis 9). Even
today, a number of sheep producer associations in western states add surcharges to their
membership dues for predator control.
Wolves and cattle, coyotes and sheep. Cattle production increased dramatical-
ly in the West during the latter half of the 1800s. “What eventually intensiﬁed the wolf
problem in the West ... , more than any other factor, was the building up of [the] cattle
industry...(Young 1944, p.377).” Indeed, most predator control livestock assessments in the
West during the late 1800s were instituted by cattle producers during the industry expansion
of that period (Young 1944, Brown 1983) (hypothesis 1).
By 1915 gray wolves were limited mainly to the rocky mountain states and northern
Minnesota, Wisconsin, and Michigan (Young 1944, p. 58). Wolf populations dwindled in
the rocky mountains during the period after 1915 (Brown 1983). Coyote populations, on the
other hand, have generally not declined. Since the early 1900s sheep producers, not cattle
producers, have been most active in contracting over predator control (Young 1978, Feldman
1996). A primary reason for this switch from cattle producer activity to sheep producer
activity is simple: wolves have the ability to kill cattle, but coyote depredation on cattle is
uncommon and limited to the occasional calf (Eadie 1954). As wolf populations diminished,
the marginal value of predator control to cattle producers decreased (hypotheses 2 and 3).
Thus, as the model predicts, cattle producers now have less incentive to form contracts over
8Table 1: Coyote harvest in the Predator Free Zone, Texas.
year 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 1994
coyotes killed 0 118 420 637 2,168 2,594
predator control. In contrast, sheep producers still actively cooperate in predator control
today because coyotes remain.7
Coyote density, sheep concentration, institutional heredity. Despite a long
history of predator control in Texas and a declining sheep and goat industry, a referendum
was held in 1992 by the Texas Sheep and Goat Raisers’ Association (TS&GRA) to impose
assessments on sheep and goats to fund predator control.8 The referendum was based on the
Texas Commodity Referendum Law of 1969, and was modeled after a beef cattle assessment
that had recently been implemented (though not for predator control). These factors —
the referendum law and the successful implementation of previous referenda — most likely
reduced the costs of implementing the predator control referendum (hypothesis 8).
Another factor promoting the predator control referendum is that the coyote population
in the major sheep producing region of the state, the Edwards Plateau, has been increasing.
By 1950, predator control eﬀorts had eliminated coyotes and wolves from the plateau, and
with the help of a drought, producers managed to keep the plateau a “coyote-free zone”
for most of the 1950s (Nunley 1995). Table 1 shows that the number of coyotes killed
in the coyote-free zone of the 1950’s has increased dramatically over time (Nunley 1995).
Predator control eﬀorts may have increased over these years, but the increase in the number
of coyotes killed suggests (though it does not imply) that the population of coyotes has
increased substantially. The model predicts that the value of a contract and the likelihood of
7In the forested northern regions of the great lakes states where little livestock production occurs (Dale
1960), the wolf and coyote were seen to be competing with game hunters — market hunters beginning in
about 1860, and later sport hunters. These groups, not livestock producers, were the dominant forces behind
organized predator control in these regions (Thiel 1993). This is consistent with the model as well.
8The TS&GRA delineated four districts based in part on livestock densities. A vote to implement a
livestock assessment was based on total vote in the district, rather than at the county level, as is the case
in several other states. Approximately 75% of producers in each district voted in support of the assessment.
Of 254 counties, 111 are in one of the three assessment districts. (McSwain 1996).
9Table 2: Assessment programs in western states.
state # of counties petition requirements industry based on units
CO 5 of 63 51% needed to change Sheep/cattle livestock head
ID All Mandatory Sheep wool Lbs.
MT 52 of 56 51% to initiate/change Sheep or cattle livestock head
NE None 67% to initiate/change. Sheep/cattle livestock head
NV All Mandatory Sheep livestock head
SD All Mandatory Sheep & cattle livestock head
TX 111 of 254 by referendum Sheep sheep head






WY All Elected reps. request
changes
Sheep/cattle livestock head
Source: State statutes, conversations with USDAWS regional directors, and Uhden (Uhden 1996). Data
applies to 1992 through 1998.
contract formation will increase as predator density increases (hypothesis 2). The formation
of a head assessment in 1992 to increase overall predator control eﬀorts is consistent with the
model. Also, the Texas sheep and goat industry is geographically concentrated, with 85%
of production taking place in 10% of the counties. This means that the eﬀects of abatement
on the land of one producer are likely to aﬀect neighboring producers more, and a coalition
among sheep and goat producers more likely than if their landholdings were more diﬀuse
(hypothesis 6).
County assessment programs. Predator control livestock assessments are codiﬁed
in the statutes of nine western states (table 2). These statutes either require an assessment
in all counties, or allow counties the option to implement one. Of the nine states with
county assessment programs, three states — Colorado, Montana, and Texas — allow non-
participation and have some counties that do impose head assessments and some that do
not.
The distribution of active assessment programs across counties within these three states
is explained using a probit regression. For Montana and Colorado, each county may be seen
as one observation of the choice to impose an assessment. The Texas program is divided
10Table 3: Probit Regression for county predator control head assessments.
-2 LOG L=271.0; Dependent Variable: obs
χ2=241.1 (p=0.0000) assessment=1 168
correctly predicted: 83.1% no assessment=0 204
Variable marginal Z-stat P-value mean
Constant -0.3466 -2.89 0.004
Sheep per pasture acre 2.7700 2.07 0.039 0.0196
Cattle per pasture acre -0.2257 -1.56 0.119 0.2687
Pasture, prop’n of county 0.2753 1.67 0.094 0.4132
CV∗, sheep inventories -0.1143 -2.55 0.011 1.5025
CV, farmsize -5.E-06 -0.55 0.584 3635.7
Avg. sheep farm size 4.E-05 2.23 0.026 2026.9
Human population density -0.2596 -0.86 0.390 0.1033
sheep farms÷human pop. 62.741 3.11 0.002 0.0044
sheep farms÷county acreage 8851.0 2.99 0.003 4.E-05
Montana Dummy 0.4262 2.39 0.017 0.1505
Colorado Dummy -0.7813 -3.86 0.000 0.1667
∗CV stands for coeﬃcient of variation. Data: U.S. Census Bureau and Census of
Agriculture, 1992. San Juan county, CO is excluded due to incomplete data.
into four districts, but to the extent that districts are delineated as if to maximize contract
value and the likelihood of passing the referendum, individual county data will provide useful
information. Furthermore, counties may vote to be included in a district on any election
year (biennial). Therefore, Texas counties are also treated as individual observations.
The probit regression results generally support the predictions of the model (table 3).
A high sheep density per pasture acre leads to a higher probability of a sheep assessment
program (hypothesis 2). Controlling for cattle density, a large percentage of county land
devoted to grazing leads to a higher probability of sheep assessments (hypothesis 6).9
If the distribution of abatement beneﬁts perfectly coincides with producer inventory
shares (and hence cost-shares), then an increase in the variance of sheep inventories should
not eﬀect the likelihood of assessment implementation. Heterogeneity over other margins
that leads to a skewed net beneﬁt distribution may reduce the likelihood of assessment
9This is consistent with Pridgen (1980) and Rook and Carlson (1985), who found that cotton farmers are
more likely to join a pest management group if a large proportion of the farmer’s land is planted in cotton.
11implementation. With this in mind, note that the coeﬃcients on CV, farmsize and CV, sheep
inventories are both negative, the latter being signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. Both types
of heterogeneity leads to reductions in the likelihood of contract formation (hypothesis 6).
A positive eﬀect of livestock inventory heterogeneity on the likelihood of contract formation
may represent a comparative advantage of public livestock assessments relative to private
assessments, which are commonly based on acreage.
Finally, As sheep farmers and sheep farming become a relatively more prominent industry
in a region, sheep-speciﬁc assessments will become more likely (hypotheses 4 and 5). This
is consistent with the positive coeﬃcients on sheep farms ÷ county acreage and sheep farms
÷ human pop[ulation].
Conclusion
This paper develops a model of a cost-share contract in which a per unit assessment is placed
on a productive input, the revenues from which are used for group-funded predator control on
participants’ land. The model implies a tradeoﬀ between eﬃciency gains from internalizing
abatement externalities and losses from private reductions of the assessed input. The model is
extended to provide refutable hypotheses regarding contract structure, value, and likelihood
of implementation. Econometric and anecdotal evidence generally supports the model. The
model may be adapted to provide insight into the potential value of assessment programs for a
wide range of common property or public goods such as groundwater and pest management.
It also provides an empirically useful framework for understanding the distribution and
incidence of cooperative resource use.
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